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The Federal Enforcement Provisions of the 1970
Amendments to the Clean Air Act: Statutory Scope
and Constitutionality
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) claims the
power under the commerce clause and certain provisions of the
1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act1 to either direct a state to
enact laws to control air pollution according to EPA standards,
or to compel the state to administer and enforce regulations as
promulgated by the EPA.2
Four states have challenged the EPA's position a t the circuit
court level.3In each of the cases, the plaintiff state had submitted
implementation plans to the EPA for its approval.~ollowing
disapproval of certain parts of the state's transportation control
plan,Vhe EPA issued substitute provisions6 and directed the
state, under penalty of injunctive and penal sanctions, to comply
with the plans as altered.' Each state objected, arguing that the
1. 42 U.S.C. $ 1857 (1970), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964).
2. 38 Fed. Reg. 30,632-33 (1973).
3. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975),petition for cert. filed,
44 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1976) (No. 75-1055); Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIR.REP.
DEC.1105 (4th Cir. Sept. 19, 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 7,
1976) (No. 75-960); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3381 (U.S. Dec. 24, 1975) (No. 75-909); Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d
Cir. 1974).
4. 37 Fed. Reg. 10,842 (1972). On May 31, 1972, the Administrator published his
initial approvals or disapprovals of state implementation plans. Noting, however, that
neither the EPA nor the states had any practical experience in the development of transportation control plans, the Administrator permitted the states to defer for approximately
one year beyond the statutory deadline the submittal of implementation plans. In addition, 21 states were allowed 2-year extensions of the deadline for attainment of the primary
standards. Id.
On January 31, 1973, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held in
NRDC v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968,970-72 (1973), that the Clean Air Act does not permit either
delay in the submission of transportation control plans or the granting of blanket extensions of the primary standards attainment date. In accordance with the court order, the
EPA cancelled all extensions and directed the states to submit transportation control
plans by April 15, 1973 designed to attain the national air quality standards by May 31,
1975. 38 Fed. Reg. 7323-24 (1973).
Sixteen states, including three of the plaintiff states, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
the District of Columbia, submitted new plans by the April 15, 1973 deadline. California,
the fourth plaintiff state, failed to submit a new plan. 38 Fed. Reg. 16,550-64 (1973).
5. 38 Fed. Reg. 16,550-69 (1973).
6. For a detailed account of all state implementation plans as modified and promulgated by the EPA see 40 C.F.R. $ 52 (1974). In particular see 40 C.F.R. $ 5 52.220-66
(California); $0 52.470-96 (District of Columbia); $6 52.1070-112 (Maryland); and 4 4
52.2020-55 (Pennsylvania).
7. 39 Fed. Reg. 33,512 (1974):
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EPA lacked statutory authority to compel state implementation
and enforcement of EPA-promulgated transportation control
plans? The states also attacked the EPA's constitutional authority, asserting that Congress cannot use the commerce power to
require a state to exercise its legislative and executive powers to
undertake assigned activities, even though federal regulation of
the activities themselves is within the reach of the commerce
power.gThe states contended that the Tenth Amendment and the
guarantee clause limit the scope of the commerce power in this
context. lo
In the first opinion issued on the point, Pennsylvania v.
EPA," the Third Circuit sustained the EPA's position. The court
held that EPA sanctions against Pennsylvania for failure to legislatively implement and enforce federally promulgated transportation control plans were both (1)within the scope of the EPA's
delegated authorityt2and (2) a valid exercise of the federal commerce power.13 On the other hand, in Brown v. EPA,14 and
Maryland v. EPA,15the Ninth and Fourth Circuits substantially
Failure to comply with any provisions of this part, or with any approved
regulatory provision of a state implementation plan, or with any permit condition or permit denial issued pursuant to approved or promulgated regulations
for the review of new or modified stationary or indirect sources, shall render the
person or governmental entity so failing to comply in violation of a requirement
of an applicable implementation plan and subject to enforcement action under
section 113 of the Clean Air Act. With regard to compliance schedules, a person
or Governmental entity will be considered to have failed t o comply with the
requirements of this part if it fails to timely submit any required compliance
schedule, if the compliance schedule when submitted does not contain each of
the elements it is required to contain, or if the person or Governmental entity
fails to comply with such schedule.
8. See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d at 831; District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d
a t 982.
9. See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d at 831; District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d
a t 981.
10. See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 841; Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIR.REP.DEC.at
1112.
11. 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974).
12. Id. a t 259.
13. Id. a t 262-63. The court did go on to say, however, that:
We recognize that there may remain a legitimate concern for possible intrusions
upon the proper functioning of our federalist system as a result of future developments in the implementation of the Clean Air Act, and this court will remain
ready to protect that concern in any appropriate case.
Id. a t 263.
14. 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3381 ( U S . Dec. 24,
1975) (No. 75-909).
15. 8 ENVIR.REP. DEC. 1105 (4th Cir. Sept. 19, 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 7, 1976) (No. 75-960).
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rejected the EPA position. Recognizing the serious constitutional
questions raised by the EPA's position and motivated by a desire
to avoid these questions,lQoth courts ruled as a matter of statutory construction that the EPA lacked authority to require states
either to establish or to enforce transportation control plans or to
impose sanctions on them for failure to do SO.'' In the most recent
decision on the issue, District of Columbia v. Train,'%he District
of Columbia Circuit took a middle position..Like the Ninth and
Fourth Circuits, the D.C. Circuit held, as a matter of statutory
construction, that the EPA exceeded its authority by ordering
"the states and municipalities to enact statutes and regulations
or to take other actions . . . necessary . . . to complete the regulatory scheme. Congress placed these duties on the Administrator, not the states when state-submitted plans are found to be
insufficient."lg The court went beyond the holdings of the Ninth
and Fourth Circuits, however, by finding that the EPA has the
statutory authority to and may constitutionally compel states to
administer EPA-promulgated programs directed to a "traditional
state function."20
The purpose of this comment is to compare and contrast the
four circuit court opinions to determine if the EPA can statutorily
and constitutionally compel states to act pursuant to certain provisions of the 1970 amendments. The first part of the comment
will set forth those provisions of the 1970 amendments relevant
to this issue.21The next two parts of the comment will treat the
16. See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d a t 837.
17. Id. a t 831; Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIR.REP. DEC.a t 1114.
18. 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Feb.
17, 1976) (NO. 75-1055).
19. Id. a t 986 (emphasis added).
20. Id. a t 987-88, 992; notes 179-182 and accompanying text infra. Virginia subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court to review this part of the decision. District of
Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975),petition for cert. filed sub nom. Virginia
v. Train, 44 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1976) (No. 75-1050).
In addition to Virginia, the Justice Department sought review of District of Columbia
v. Train, as well as Brown v. EPA and Maryland v. EPA. In so doing the Justice Department emphasized that review is necessary because of the "widely varying and inconsistent
conclusions" reached by the different appellate courts. The Justice Department pointed
out that the constitutional principles involved "are fundamental to the federal system,"
and that "the final resolution of the conflict among the circuits may substantially determine what legislative alternatives are available to Congress in the future." The Justice
Department also asserted that the EPA's authority to require states to enforce transportation control plans "is of basic importance to the effectiveness of the Clean Air Act." 6
ENVIR.REP.-CURRENTDEVELOPMENTS
1497 (1975).
21. For a detailed description of the 1970 amendments see, e.g., Jorling, The Federal
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW1058 (E. Dolgin ed. 1974);
Law of Air Pollution Control, in FEDERAL
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substantive issues in the same order as they were treated by the
courts: first, the limits of the EPA's statutory authority, and
second, the constitutionality of this particular exercise of authority.

A.

The General Scheme

F u n ~ t i o n a l l ythe
, ~ ~1970 amendments can be divided into two
elements: (1) the programmatic element,23which encompasses
such matters as federal research24and technical and financial
a ~ s i s t a n c eand
, ~ ~(2) the regulatory element, which includes provisions for the establishment and enforcement of air quality control
standards.26Although the .programmatic element of the 1970
amendments is based on the longstanding doctrine that the regulation of air pollution is the primary responsibility of states and
local government^,^ the scope of the doctrine is substantially
narrowed by the dual federal-state implementation and enforcement scheme created in the regulatory element.28
Keener, A Current Survey of Federal Air Quality Control Legislation and Regulations, 5
NATURAL
RESOURCES
LAWYER
42 (1972); Kramer, The 1970 Clean Air Amendments: Federalism in Action or Inaction?, 6 TEXASTECH.
L. REV.47 (1974); Luneburg, Federal-State
Interaction Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 14 B.C. IND.& COM.L. REV.637
(1973); Comment, 1970 Clean Air Amendments: Use and Abuse of the State Implementation Plan, 26 BAYLOR
L. REV.232 (1974); Comment, State Implementation Plans and Air
Quality Enforcement, 4 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 595 (1975).
22. Structurally, the Clean Air Act, as amended through 1970, is subdivided into three titles. Title 1 includes the general policy statements, authorizations of programs for financial and technical assistance, research authorizations,
and the general framework for the control of ambient pollutants and emissions
from stationary sources. Title 11 includes controls relating to emissions from
moving sources, primarily automobiles, trucks, and aircraft. Title 111 includes
general administrative and judicial authorizations.
Jorling, supra note 21, at 1062.
23. This comment will not describe the specific parts of the programmatic element
because most of the issues in the cases arose from the regulatory element.
24. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1857b (1970).
25. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. $ 5 1857b-1, 1857i, 1858a (1970).
26. For discussion see notes 29-49 and accompanying text infra.
27. 42 U.S.C. $ 1857(a)(3) (1970) represents the first congressional pronouncement
on the primacy of the state and local role in air pollution control. It was enacted in 1955.
New language was added by the 1970 amendments asserting the primary state role "for
assuring air quality" and meeting the national ambient air quality standards. Id. 5 1857c2.
28. For an excellent discussion of the doctrine of "primary state and local responsibility" and how this doctrine came to be narrowly applied in the 1970 amendments see
Kramer, supra note 21, a t 49-67. As Kramer points out, two policies motivated the intrusion into this long standing doctrine: first, the recognition of air pollution as a serious
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B. Implementation Plans
An important part of the overall scheme created by the 1970
amendments is the state formulation of implementation plans
specifying how air quality standards previously established by
the EPAZ9will be achieved, maintained, and enforced in each
state.30 In pertinent part, section i10(a)(l)31 specifies that
"[elach State shall . . . adopt and submit to the Administrator
. . . a plan which provides for implementation, maintenance,
and enforcement of such primary standard . . . ."32Section
l10(a)(2)33and ensuing regulations3' delimit the contents of state
implementation plans required for EPA approval and set out the
appropriate time limits35within which these plans are to be subnational problem, and second, the inability or failure of the states under previous regulations and acts to cope with the problem. Kramer also speculates, however, whether the
sponsors of the legislation themselves realized what they had wrought in terms of federal
enforcment. Id. a t 53.
29. On April 30, 1971, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 8 1857c-4 (1970), the Administrator
promulgated national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards for six pollutants. Primary standards specify the levels of concentration of those pollutants in the
ambient air above which there are identifiable health effects. Secondary standards protect
the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with such
pollutants. 36 Fed. Reg. 22,384 (1971). "Ambient air" has been defined by the EPA to
mean that portion of the atmosphere external to buildings to which the general public has
access. Id.
30. 42 U.S.C. $ 1857~-5(1970).
31. Id. $ 1857c-5(a)(l).
32. Id.:
Each State shall, after reasonable notice and public hearings, adopt and
submit to the Administrator, within nine months after the promulgation of a
national primary ambient air quality standard (or any revision thereof) under
section 1857c-4 of this title for any air pollutant, a plan which provides for
implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such primary standard in
each air quality control region (or portion thereof) within such State. In addition, such State shall adopt and submit to the Administrator (either as a part
of a plan submitted under the preceding sentence or separately) within nine
months after the promulgation of a national ambient air quality secondary
standard (or revision thereof), a plan which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such secondary standard in each air quality control
region (or portion thereof) within such State. Unless a separate public hearing
is provided, each State shall consider its plan implementing such secondary
standard a t the hearing required by the first sentence of this paragraph.
to -(H).
33. Id. $ 4 1857~-5(a)(2)(A)
34. 40 C.F.R. $ 4 51-52 (1974).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(l)(1970). Following state submission of implementation
plans, the Administrator was given four months to approve or disapprove the plans. Id. $
1857c-5(a)(2).
These strict time limits have received strong judicial support. See, e.g., NRDC v.
EPA, 475 F.2d 968,970 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Act provides, however, two exceptions. First,
the Administrator may extend the 3-year period in which state plans must provide for
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mitted. After review of a state's plan, the EPA may accept it3'
and delegate to that state the authority to enforce the plan,37or
the EPA may reject part or all of the plan and issue its own
implementation plan for the state." In either case, the plan becomes federal law,39enforceable by the EPA pursuant to section
113.40

C. Enforcement of Standards and Plans
Key provisions of the 1970 amendments provide for parallel
state and federal enforcement of each of the standards in the
approved implementation plan." The state enforcement mechanism is governed by section 110(a)(l), but because no specific
method of enforcement is provided in this s e c t i ~ n ,the
' ~ EPA has
issued federal regulations to serve as guidelines.'% effect, these
regulations require the states to "enforce applicable laws, regulations and standards, and seek injunctive relief.""
The federal enforcement mechanism is defined in section 113
of the 1970 amendments, which significantly expands the scope
and potential effectiveness of federal enforcement. Under this
attainment of national ambient air quality standards, 42 U.S.C. § 1857~-5(a)(2)(A)(i)
(1970) for not more than an additional 2 years upon a gubernatorial request for such an
extension, id. 8 1857c-5(e)(l);and second, the Administrator may extend up to 1 year the
compliance with any state implementation plan for a source or class of sources, also upon
gubernatorial request, id. 8 1857c-5(f)(l). For an extensive discussion of these exceptions
see Kramer, supra note 21, a t 71-75.
36. 42 U.S.C. $5 1857~-5(a)(2),43) (1970).
37. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 8 1857c-6(c)(l) (1970) (power to implement and enforce
standards of performance).
38. Id. § 1857~-5(c)(l):
The Administrator shall, after consideration of any state hearing record,
promptly prepare and publish proposed regulations setting forth an implementation plan, or portion thereof, for a State if(A) the State fails t o submit an implementation plan for any national
ambient air quality primary or secondary standard within the time prescribed,
(B) the plan, or any portion thereof, submitted for such State is determined by the Administrator not to be in accordance with the requirements of
this section, or,
(C) the State fails, within 60 days after notification by the Administrator
or such longer period as he may prescribe, to revise an implementation plan as
required pursuant to a provision of its plan referred to in subsection (a)(2)(H)
of this section.
39. Approval of a plan and the regulations therein results in the adoption of the state
law as federal law and is considered rulemaking subject to the requirements of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § § 500-59 (1970).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1857~-8(1970).
41. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-6(c), -7(d) (1970).
42. 42 U.S.C. $ 1857c-5(a)(l) (1970). For the text of this section see note 32 supra.
43. See, e.g., 38 Fed. Reg. 30,632-33 (1973); 40 C.F.R. § 51.11(a)(2) (1973).
44. 40 C.F.R. § 51.11(a)(2) (1973).
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section, the EPA has authority, either on its own initiative or
when a state fails to act, to enforce the plan against any "person"
in violation there~f.~"'Person"is defined in section 302(e)16of the
Act to include any "State, municipality, and political subdivision
of a State." If a violation is not corrected within a 30-day period
following notification, the EPA can either issue an order requiring
If a
compliance or initiate a civil action against the ~iolator.~'
compliance order is violated, criminal penalties of up to $25,000
per day or one-year imprisonment can be imposed.4RIf civil action
is initiated, a court may grant an injunction or any other relief it
considers appropriate.jg
45. 42 U.S.C. 8 1857c-8(a)(l), -(2) (1970):
(1) Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the Administrator finds that any person is in violation of any requirement of an applicable
implementation plan, the Administrator shall notify the person in violation of
the plan and the State in which the plan applies of such finding. If such violation
extends beyond the 30th day after the date of the Administrator's notification,
the Administrator may issue an order requiring such person to comply with the
requirements of such plan or he may bring a civil action in accordance with
subsection (b) of this section.
(2) Whenever, on the basis of information available to him, the Administrator
finds that violations of an applicable implementation plan are so widespread
that such violations appear to result from a failure of the State in which the plan
applies to enforce the plan effectively, he shall so notify the State. If the Administrator finds such failure extends beyond the 30th day after such notice, he shall
give public notice of such finding. During the period beginning with such public
notice and ending when such State satisfies the Administrator that it will enforce such plan (hereafter referred to in this section as "period of federally
assumed enforcement"), the Administrator may enforce any requirement of
such plan with respect to any person(A) by issuing an order to comply with such requirement, or
(B) by bringing a civil action under subsection (b) of this section.
46. Id. § 1857h(e).
47. Id. § 1857c-8(a)(l),42). For the text of these sections see note 45 supra.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1857~-8(c)(l)
(1970) states in pertinent part:
Any person who knowingly(A) violates any requirement of an applicable implementation plan during
any period of Federally assumed enforcement more than 30 days after having
been notified by the Administrator under subsection (a)(l) of this section that
such person is violating such requirement, or
(B) violates or fails or refuses to comply with any order issued by the
Administrator under subsection (a) of this section, . . .

....

shall be punished by a fine of not more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by
imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(b) (1970) states in pertinent part:
The Administrator may commence a civil action for appropriate relief,
including a permanent or temporary injunction, whenever any person(1) violates or fails or refuses to comply with any order issued under subsection
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Statutory Construction as a Means of Avoiding
Constitutional Issues

It is well settled that federal courts do not pass on questions
of constitutionality unless such adjudication is unavoidable."'
Beginning from this premise, each circuit court first considered
whether the authority delegated to the EPA by the 1970 amendments included the authority to bring federal enforcement procedures against states that fail to implement and enforce implementation plans.
Although each circuit followed traditional principles of statutory construction in determining the scope of the EPA's authority, the specific criteria used and the way in which each circuit
applied the criteria varied substantially. It is not within the scope
of this comment to discuss in any detail the voluminous rules and
theories dealing with specific criteria of statutory c o n s t r ~ c t i o n . ~ ~
Rather, the emphasis here is on evaluating each circuit's interpretation of the 1970 amendments on the basis of five general criteria: (1) reliance on the plain meaning of the statute; (2) use of
intrinsic aids of interpretation; (3) recourse to the legislative history; (4) deference to the administrative interpretation; and (5)
recognition of overriding policy considerations. The purpose of
this evaluation is not to suggest a single proper way of interpreting the 1970 amendments. Indeed, taken together, the four cases
aptly support the proposition that "there is no table of logarithms
Any final and conclusive interpretafor statutory constru~tion."~~
tion must necessarily be left to the appropriate legislative or judicial body.

B. Plain Meaning Rule
The task of statutory interpretation by the judiciary has traditionally been preceded by a noninterpretive examination of the
(a) of this section; or (2) violates any requirements of an applicable implementation plan during any period of Federally assumed enforcement more than 30
days after having been notified by the Administrator under subsection (a)(l) of
this section of a finding that such person is violating such requirement; . . .
50. E.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947).
51. For an excellent analysis of principles of statutory construction see 2A J. SUTHEHLAND,STATUTES
AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
(4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as 2A
SUTHERLAND]
.
52. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REV.527,
543 (1947).
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language in which the statute is framed." "Where the language
is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of
interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtAlthough this deference to
ful meanings need no discu~sion."~~
the "plain meaning" of the words has now generally yielded to
broader, more "legislative intent" oriented approachesssto statutory interpretation, it still finds expression in numerous cases.56
In interpreting the 1970 amendments, each of the cases restricting the EPA's authority referred to the plain meaning of the
statute. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit in Brown v. EPA, the
Fourth Circuit in Maryland v. EPA, and the D.C. Circuit in
District of Columbia u. Train emphasized that if Congress had
intended to give the EPA such broad enforcement powers against
the states, it could have done so in plain words.57Each court,
however, found "little in the language of the Act to indicate that
the Administrator has been empowered to order that legislatures
and municipal bodies in the states enact statutes and regulations
or to bring federal enforcement actions against those governmental units to do so."58
A major difference between the three circuits emerges, however. The Ninth and D.C. Circuits applied the plain meaning rule
53. See 2A SUTHERLAND,
supra note 51, 88 46.01-.07.
54. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917), citing Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899).
55. [Wlords are inexact tools a t best and for that reason there is wisely
no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how
"clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.' "
Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476,479 (1943), citing United States v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940).
In theory, the "plain meaning rule" implies a preference for an interpretation according to what the statute means, or may be supposed to mean, to those affected by it. In
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,396-97 (1951), Justice Jackson
defended this preference in a dissenting opinion, stating:
Moreover, there are practical reasons why we should accept whenever possible
the meaning which an enactment reveals on its face. Laws are intended for all
of our people to live by . . . . T o accept legislative debates to modify statutory
provisions is to make the law inaccessible to a large part of the country.
Modern approaches to statutory construction, on the other hand, most often emphasize
"legislative intent," which implies a preference for the "sending end" of the communication as determined by legislative and administrative materials. For a short discussion of
L.Q. 174 (1952).
these differences see 26 TEMP.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 517 F.2d 953, 967-68 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), where Judge Mansfield asserts that the plain
meaning rule is alive and viable.
REP.
57. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d a t 984-86; Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIR.
DEC.a t 1114; Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d a t 834-35.
58. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d a t 986.
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only to reinforce interpretations arrived a t by other means." The
Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, despite avowed reliance on
,~
to have relied on
principles of statutory c o n ~ t r u c t i o n appears
the plain meaning rule as the primary basis for its decision." In
its short, two-paragraph discussion of the statutory authority
issue, the court concluded that "[tlhe statute in plain words
authorizes the Administrator to 'prepare . . . regulations . . . for
a State;' it does not empower him to direct a state to enact its
own statutes and regulations as prescribed by the Administrator."E2Plainly, there is no provision in the Act which states in
unequivocal terms that a state must implement and enforce its
own plan or be subject to federal enforcement procedures. However, the Fourth Circuit's failure to expressly distinguish convincing EPA arguments indicating a contrary legislative intentUseriously undermines the opinion and points out the inadequacies of
the plain meaning rule when used as a starting and ending point
of statutory construction.

C. Intrinsic Aids of Interpretation
The modern starting point of statutory construction is to
read and examine the act and to draw inferences concerning
meaning from its composition and structure. Inferences thus
drawn are referred to as intrinsic aids of interpretation because
they derive meaning from the internal structure of the text." It
is with this tool that the EPA most convincingly supports its
interpretation of the 1970 amendments. The EPA points out that
-

59. See notes 69-84 and accompanying text infra.
60. The court stated: "We are thus of the opinion, and so hold, that the EPA was
REP.
without authority under the statute as a matter of statutory construction." 8 ENVIR.
DEC.a t 1114.
61. It may be that the Fourth Circuit relied on other principles of statutory construction, but concluded that it was unnecessary to discuss them because the language of the
statute appeared to the court to be plain and specific. In this context, compare Maryland
u. EPA with United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210-11 (4th Cir. 1972), where the
Fourth Circuit cited legislative history in support of its conclusion as to the plain meaning
of the statute. See also 2A SUTHERLAND,
supra note 51, § 46.02, a t 52:
[Lliteral interpretation consists of an approach which (a) concentrates attention upon and maximizes the significance of the statutory text, ( b ) takes into
consideration less rather than more indicia of meaning other than the statutory
text, instead of not considering such indicia a t all as is sometimes claimed, and
(c) often may take extra-textual considerations into account only subconsciously
or unconsciously rather than deliberately and purposefully.
62. 8 ENVIR.
REP. DEC.at 1114.
63. See notes 65-66, 90-91 and accompanying text infra.
64. See 2A SUTHERLAND,
supra note 51, 9 9 47.01-.38.
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the word "person" as used in section 113 of the statute is defined
in section 302(e) to include state^."'^ Basing its argument on the
presumption that the meaning of words as defined in the definition section ~ontrols,'~
the EPA argues that states are subject to
the enforcement provisions of section 113.
The difficulty with definitions, however, is that definitions
are also written in words that must be defined. Although each of
the circuits acknowledged the binding effect of the definition of
"person" in section 302(e)," they disagreed on what Congress
meant by the word "States" in the definition. The Third Circuit
in Pennsylvania v. EPA held that " Congress did contemplate"
the possibility that the definition section used in connection with
section 113 could be used to force states to implement transportation control plans.ss The Ninth Circuit in Brown v. EPA and the
D.C. Circuit in District of Columbia v. Train, however, distinguished a state that pollutes and a state that chooses not to
control pollution caused by the general public. Only the former,
concluded both circuits, was intended by Congress to be included
in the meaning of "State."69
In support of their interpretation, the Ninth and D.C. Circuits drew several inferences from the text of the statute. Both
circuits held that the notice provisions in section 113(a)(1)70requiring the EPA to notify both the "person" in violation of the
plan and the "State" in which the plan applies distinguish "person" from "state" and clearly indicate that they are two distinct
entities." The Ninth Circuit refused to invalidate this distinction
by reading into section 113 the statutory definition of "person,"
stating that "the Administrator had no difficulty in making clear
his intention to impose sanctions on states not enforcing effectively implementation plans. Congress can be expected to have
65. Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d a t 256-57; 38 Fed. Reg. 30,632-33 (1973).
66. See generally Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947); Packard
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S.485 (1947).
It is also asserted that a statutory definition that declares what a term "includes"
rather than what a term "means" is more susceptible to an extension of meaning. 2A
SUTHERLAND,
supra note 51, § 47.07, a t 82. The definition of "person" in § 302(e) declares
what the term "includes" and is, therefore, even more favorable t o the EPA interpretation.
67. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d a t 983.
68. 500 F.2d a t 257.
69. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d a t 983; Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d a t 832.
This distinction is consistent with modem legislative efforts t o invalidate the notion of
sovereign immunity by including "states" in the definition of "persons." 3 J. SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES
AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
$ 62.03 (4th ed. 1974).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(l) (1970). For the text of this section see note 45 supra.
71. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d a t 985; Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d a t 834.
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no less capacity for ~larity."'~
The D.C. Circuit found that two
notices would not have been required if Congress had expected
the states to enact and enforce applicable transportation control
plans. According to the court, "[tlhe most 'efficient' enforcement from the standpoint of commitment of federal resources
would be to order the state to take action against the violator and
proceed against state officials under section 113(b) or (c) if they
fail to act."73
The D.C. Circuit went on to draw a number of additional
inferences from the statutory text in support of its interpretation.
First, the court distinguished the phrases "violations of an applicable implementation plan" and "a failure of the State in which
the plan applies to enforce the plan effectively," both of which
are found in section ll3(a)(2).74The court stated that:
Since widespread violations "result from" a state's failure to
enforce a plan, the language strongly suggests Congress did not
believe that inadequate state enforcement was, by itself, a "violation." Rather, the term "violation" must logically refer to the
emission of pollutants into the air contrary to the provisions of
an applicable implementation plan .75

The court also found the procedures to be followed by the EPA
in commencing "the period of federally assumed enforcement"
referred'to in section 113(a)(2) to be inconsistent with the EPA's
broad interpretation of its own powers.76
Second, as to section l10(a)(l),77the D.C. Circuit characterized the language "[elach state shall . . . submit . . . a plan"
as directory rather than mandatory, which negated the EPA's
position that Congress intended to allow the EPA to force states
to implement plans." The court's conclusion on this point is contrary, however, to two presumptions which favor construing this
section as mandatory. First, the word "shall" is ordinarily presumed to be used in the imperative rather than the directory
72. 521 F.2d a t 834.
73. 521 F.2d a t 985.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(2)(1970). For the text of this section see note 45 supra.
75. 521 F.2d a t 985-86.
76. Id. a t 986. The court gave two reasons for this conclusion: first, the dual notice
provisions of § 113 indicate a congressional intent that enforcement provisions during the
"period of federally assumed enforcement" should be used against polluters only and not
the states; second, the provision for terminating the federal enforcement period is voluntary and therefore not required of the states. Id.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(l) (1970). For the text of this section see note 32 supra.
78. 521 F.2d a t 986.
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sense.79 Second, a mandatory construction is generally favored
unless a statute's directory character clearly appears." Neither of
these presumptions, however, is conclusive. One well-defined exception, described in a subsequent section of this comment, specifies that a statute should be given a directory meaning where an
imperative construction might involve an unconstitutional delegation of power.R' The D.C. Circuit, however, did not expressly
rely on this exception. Instead, the court found it significant that
Congress did not provide in section 110 any means of directly
forcing the states to comply.R2It appears that the court employed
a "stated consequences" exception; that is, where the consequences or punishment imposed for violating a particular provision of an act are not exclusive and preemptory, the provision is
. ~ ~D.C. Circuit found that the
generally regarded as d i r e c t ~ r yThe
terms of section 110 are not exclusive since the EPA is expressly
required to prepare, in whole or in part, plans for states that fail
to comply. This indicated to the court that Congress did not feel
that state-adopted regulations were necessary to achieve the goal
of the 1970 amendments. The court stated: "On the contrary,
section 110(c) specifically contemplates that some states would
fail to live up to their 'responsibility.'
In contrast to the Ninth and D.C. Circuits' careful scrutiny
of the statutory text, the Third Circuit did not draw any inference
except that associated with the statutory definition of "person. "
One explanation for the Third Circuit's brevity in this area may
be that the court did not feel obligated to go beyond the defini,
the
tional presumption already in its f a v ~ r . ~ V n d e e dalthough
79. 2A SUTHERLAND,
supra note 51, § 57.03.
80. Id. 4 57.01, a t 413.
81. See notes 109-111 and accompanying text infra.
82. 521 F.2d a t 986.
supra note 51, 4 57.08, a t 423, quoting Tuthill v. Rendeleman,
83. 2A SUTHERLAND,
387 Ill. 321, 350, 56 N.E.2d 375, 390 (1944).
84. 521 F.2d a t 984. The Fourth Circuit in Maryland o. EPA may have been influenced by a similar argument raised by the Maryland brief, even though there is no
mention of the argument in the text of t h e opinion. Although the Third Circuit in
Pennsylvania v. EPA had concluded that the 1970 amendments indicated an "underlying
assumption" that states could be required to implement transportation control plans,
Maryland argued: "On the contrary, Sections 110(c) and 113(a)(2) clearly indicate an
assumption that they (the states) could not be required to do so . . . If it were true that
the States could be required to implement a Plan, then these provisions for direct federal
REP.
action would be superfluous." Brief for Petitioner a t 26, Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIH.
DEC. 1105 (4th Cir. 1975).
85. Generally such a presumption is overcome only if the statutory definition creates
obvious incongruities in the statute, or where one of the major purposes of the statute is
STATdestroyed by obedience to the statutory definition. See generally 1A J . SUTHEHI~AND,
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Ninth Circuit relied on inferences drawn from the statutory text,
its opinion suggests that these inferences by themselves would
probably not have been sufficient to overcome the presumption
of validity in favor of the definitional section. The court based its
rejection of the presumption "primarily" on constitutional
grounds, stating that "Congress would not have intended to take
such a step in the light of the delicacy with which federal-state
The efficacy of using
relations always have been treated . . .
constitutional considerations as a basis of statutory construction
is discussed in a subsequent section.87

D. Extrinsic Aids of Interpretation - Legislative History
Despite historical limitations, a federal court may now consider legislative history in construing a statute even when the
words, taken alone, have an unambiguous meaning." Characteristic of this trend is the Third Circuit opinion in Pennsylvania v.
E P A which supported its definitional argument with certain
statements selected from the voluminous history of the 1970
a r n e n d m e n t ~ In
. ~ ~particular, the court held that certain statements clearly show Congress' intention that the states would be
required to cooperate in "inspection and maintenance" programs
for all state registered automobiles.g0Because the states were required to cooperate in these kinds of programs, the court inferred
a clear legislative expectation that the states should implement
other portions of their transportation control plans, and could, in
fact, be required to do
The specific statements relied on by the Third Circuit are
important, although the Third Circuit may have overemphasized
UTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
§ 20.08 (4th ed. 1972). To the Third Circuit, obedience
to the statutory definition apparently caused none of these problems.
86. 521 F.2d a t 834.
87. Notes 109-112 and accompanying text infra.
88. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534,543-44 (1940);
United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 561-62 (1940).
89. For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of the 1970 amendments see
Kramer, supra note 21, a t 49-67.
90. 500 F.2d a t 258. "[Tlhe implementation plan section of the proposed bill would
specifically provide that, to the extent necessary, each region develop motor vehicle
inspection and testing programs . . . ." S. REP.NO. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970)
(emphasis added); "[Tlhese standards must be put into effect by the communities and
the states, and we expect them to have the men to do the actual enforcing." 116 CONG.
REC.19,204 (1970) (remarks of Representative Staggers). "[TI he legislation provides that
States must require inspection of motor vehicles in actual use . . . ." H.R. REP.NO.1146,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970) (emphasis added).
91. 500 F.2d a t 258.
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them. Indeed, excessive reliance on a few short statements extracted from a copious legislative history, no less than the literalism of the plain meaning rule, may lead to a distorted view of the
statutory purpose since less thought is spent on the future implications of a committee report or explanation on the floor than on
the selection of the words of a statute.92In this respect, the brief
submitted to the Ninth Circuit by California identifies some of
the limitations of the statements relied on by the Third Circuit.
According to the state, none of the quotations cited by the Third
Circuit mention the possibility of federal sanctions being imposed
on states that fail to enforce applicable implementation plans.
Furthermore, the quotations all appear to have been taken from
discussions of what a state must do in order to have an acceptable
plan rather than from discussions of what power the EPA has to
force states to act.93
Whatever the merits of the specific quotations, they were of
enough significance to induce responses from the Ninth Circuit
in Brown v. EPA and the D.C. Circuit in District of Columbia v.
Train. It is not surprising, in light of the Ninth Circuit's express
desire to avoid confronting serious constitutional issues, that the
court, by finding the entire legislative history ambiguous and
,~~
the Third
therefore of no value to any i n t e r p r e t a t i ~ n rejected
Circuit's quotations from the legislative history. The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, accepted the Third Circuit's reasoning,
but only to the extent of the maintenance and inspection programs expressly referred to in the quotations. As to these programs, the court found that the Act neither specifically rejects the
Administrator's claim of power nor expressly supports it." Finding this ambiguity in the Act, the court accepted the quotations
from the legislative history and upheld the EPA's interpretation,
subject to constitutional c~nsiderations.~"
92. Cf. Wasby, Legislative Materials as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation: A C a ~ ~ e a t ,
12 J. PUB.L. 262 (1963).
93. Reply Brief for Petitioner a t 16-17, Brown V. .EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975).
94. 521 F.2d at 835-36. Where a court determines the applicable legislative history
of an act to be ambiguous, the general rule is that the legislative history should be ignored
in favor of a n application of the clear and precise statutory language and purpose. Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 (1971); Greenwood v. United
States, 350 U.S. 366, 374 (1956). Although the Ninth Circuit looked to the language of
the statute, it is clear that its interpretation was primarily motivated by deference to
constitutional concerns. See notes 109-112 and accompanying text infra.
95. 521 F.2d at 988.
96. See notes 174-182 and accompanying text infra.
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E. Extrinsic Aids of Interpretation - Deference to
Administrator
As in the instant case, it often happens that before a federal
statute is brought to the courts for interpretation, the agency
charged with its administration has already promulgated interpretive regulations. The question then becomes: To what extent, if a t all, should the administrative agency's determination
of the meaning of the act be taken into account by the reviewing
court? This question received varied treatment from the different
circuits.
The general rule, as identified by the Third, Fourth, and
D.C. Circuits, is that the construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with supervision of the statute is entitled
to "great deferenceMg7because the specialized experience and
breadth of information available to administrative officials give
them greater opportunities for accurately determining the congressional intention than are afforded to the courts, especially as
concerns the making of interstitial law.gRThe Third Circuit in
Pennsylvania v. EPA gave great deference to the EPA's interpretation, for example, because "it represents the judgment of one
charged with carrying out the statutory provisions 'while they are
yet untried and new' . . . .9999
Such great deference is significant in that it limits the otherwise broad scope of judicial review.'"" This is clear from the four
opinions construing the 1970 amendments. In holding that the
EPA's interpretation was entitled to great weight, the Third Circuit set up a "compelling evidence" standard; that is, the court
refused to prohibit any agency action imperative to the success
of the Act "in the absence of compelling evidence that such
[prohibition] was Congress' intention."'" Since the court did not
find any compelling evidence that Congress did not intend to
make states subject to enforcement procedures for failure to implement plans, the court upheld the EPA interpretation. The
Ninth, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits avoided the narrow confines of
the compelling evidence standard. Although the Ninth and D.C.
97. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
98. Cf. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).
99. 500 F.2d at 257, quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288
U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
100. Cf. 4 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE
LAWTREATISE
fI fI 28.01-29.11 (1958).
101. 500 F.2d at 258 (citations omitted). In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit apparently accepted the EPA's factual determination that state action is imperative
to the success of the clean air legislation. 38 Fed. Reg. 30,632-33 (1973).
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Circuits were mute on the entire issue, the Fourth Circuit refused
to give great weight to the EPA's interpretation on the broad
ground that it was not in accordance with law.'"*
The refusal of the Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits to give
great weight to the EPA's interpretation may be explained by
exceptions to the general rule. First, it is clear that the courts
remain the final authorities on issues of statutory construction,
and "are not obliged to stand aside and rubberstamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with
a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy
underlying a statute."lo3Besides being subject to the general limitations of the Administrative Procedure Act,'04 agency decisions
are often limited by a rule restricting an agency from deciding the
limits of its own statutory p o w e r s . ' " ~ l t h o u g hnot expressly
stated by any of the courts, the EPA interpretation of the 1970
amendments is arguably in this category of decisionmaking.

F. Conclusion - Policy Considerations
Courts have traditionally favored statutory construction that
e
Circuit in
is consistent with public p ~ l i c y . ~ " T hThird
Pennsylvania v. EPA accurately pointed out that Congress intended "sweeping changes" in the antipollution laws when it enacted the 1970 amendments.'" Emphasis on these sweeping
changes plus the seriousness of the pollution problem in the cities
and states induced the court to liberally read the Act so as to
better effectuate the manifested purpose. The Ninth, Fourth, and
D.C. Circuits, on the other hand, strictly construed the 1970
amendments against the EPA's interpretation without mention
of any intended sweeping changes. Although each court purported to base its decision on the various criteria of statutory
construction previously discussed, it is clear that constitutional
considerations were of primary importance to a t least the Ninth
102. 8 ENVIH.REP.DEC.at 1114, citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
103. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U S . 278, 291 (1965).
104. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970).
105. See Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U S . 358, 369 (1946). As to this rule,
one court stated:
[T]he fact that the rule is a good rule and has the effect claimed for it, does
not validate an unlawful rule. As the board did not have the power to make the
rule, the fact that it might be beneficial is immaterial.
Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins, 88 Cal. App. 2d 438, 199 P.2d 34, 42 (1948).
supra note 51, 8 4 56.01-.05.
106. See generally 2A SUTHERLAND,
107. 500 F.2d a t 257.
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Circuit in Brown v. EPA and the Fourth Circuit in Maryland v.
EPA. To both circuits a finding in favor of the EPA's interpretation of the statutory authority issue would have required invalidation of the 1970 a r n e n d m e n t ~ . ~ " ~
A corollary to the rule that courts should avoid constitutional
questions if at all possible is the rule that if one among alternate
constructions involves serious constitutional difficulties, then the
construction not constitutionally infirm should be adopted.10Y
This rule of statutory construction is illustrated by a recent group
of United States Supreme Court cases dealing with federal crimi~ ~these
~
cases, federal prosecutors urged the
nal l e g i ~ l a t i o n .In
Court to broadly construe certain federal statutes so as to permit
federal criminal jurisdiction in areas of traditionally local governance. The Supreme Court avoided the constitutional issues arising under the commerce clause, however, by restricting the scope
of the subject legislation. In one of the cases, Justice Marshall
explained the rationale for narrowly construing the legislation:
[Ulnless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be
deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance.
Congress has traditionally been reluctant to define as a federal
crime conduct readily denounced a s criminal by t h e
States. . . . [W]e will not be quick to assume that Congress
has meant to effect a signficant change in the sensitive relation
between federal and state criminal jurisdiction. In traditionally
sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance,
the requirement of clear statement assures that the legislature
has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical
matters involved in the judicial

The sovereign balance in federal-state relations is also involved in interpreting the 1970 amendments and, therefore, an
equally clear congressional statement should be present before
legislation is construed so as to alter this balance. It appears that
the Ninth Circuit in Brown v. EPA was looking for such a clear
statement when it stated:
Congress would not have intended to take such a step in the
108. See, e.g., Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIR.
REP.DEC.a t 1113.
109. Blasecki v. City of Durham, 456 F.2d 87, 93 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Application of the United States, 427
F.2d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 1970).
110. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S.
336 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971); United States v. Five Gambling
Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953).
111. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (footnote omitted).
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light of the delicacy with which federal-state relations always
have been treated by all branches of the Federal go~ernrnent."~

Indeed, the interpretations of the Ninth, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits correctly embrace the Supreme Court's reasoning since neither the statute nor the legislative history contain a clear statement that the federal-state balance should be altered to allow
federal control of state legislative and administrative processes.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
The EPA Administrator in each of the cases claimed that the
commerce clause provided authority for his actions.ltRThe states
conceded that the commerce clause, as expansively interpreted
by past Supreme Court decisions, 114 does give the Administrator
-

--

-

- -

-

-

112. 521 F.2d a t 834.
113. For the Administrator's position see 38 Fed. Reg. 30,632-33 (1973). The commerce power has been the basis for a substantial amount of comprehensive federal legislation, the constitutionality of which has been upheld by the Supreme Court. See, e . g . , Swift
& Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 4 1-7
(1970)); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. $8 151-66 (1970)); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. $ 8 201 et seq. (1970)); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) (Agriculture Adjustment Act, 52 Stat. 31, as amended, 7 U.S.C. # # 1281 et seq.
(1970)); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (Civil Rights Act of 1964,28 U.S.C.
Q 1447, 42 U.S.C. $4 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a to h-6 (1970)).
114. There is little doubt, as conceded by the states, that the art. I, ji 8 grant to
Congress of the power to regulate commerce is broad. Judicial decisions construing the
commerce power most expansively have relied primarily on Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), the first case to deal with the scope
of the commerce clause. Chief Justice Marshall's oft-quoted language is: "This power, like
all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent,
and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution." Id. at
196. Qualified only by the statement that the commerce clause does not give Congress
power over completely internal concerns of individual states, this broad view of the commerce power, plus Chief Justice Marshall's expansive interpretation of the necessary and
proper clause has made the commerce power a potent tool of congressional regulation.
Chief Justice Marshall made the following statement concerning the necessary and proper
clause:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
The case most often cited for the liberal judicial extension of the commerce power is
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), wherein the Court held that the commerce power
extended to regulate the price of a small farmer's crops which were to be used wholly for
his own consumption. The case was particularly significant because of its promulgation
of the "aggregate affect" concept. Simply put, the Court found that although the farmer
involved in the particular case grew crops strictly for his own consumption, the "aggregate
affect" of the local activities of all those similarly situated did have the requisite "substnn-
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broad regulatory powers.11gClearly, pollution affects interstate
commerce and therefore the Administrator has the right to promulgate pollution control plans and enforce them against individual polluters, including states. Nevertheless, the states argued
that the Tenth Amendment implicitly prevents the Administrator from compelling the states to exercise their legislative and
administrative powers to administer the federal plan.I1Vn addressing the states' contention, the circuit courts were faced with
two questions: (1)Does the Tenth Amendment limit the federal
government's intrusion, pursuant to the commerce power, into
traditional state affairs?"' (2) If it does, what is the scope of the
Tenth Amendment's limitations on the federal government?

A. Nature of the Problem
The necessity for a constitutional limitation arose after Chief
Justice Marshall described the commerce power as "complete in
itself" and "acknowledg[ing] no limitations, other than are pre~ ~the
~ federal government began
scribed in the C o n s t i t u t i ~ n . "As
to regulate state activities pursuant to its commerce power, the
states sought for the constitutional prescription spoken of by
Marshall. In spite of its unfortunate wording, the Tenth Amendment was the states' best constitutional argument: "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."11s
tial affect" on interstate commerce. Id. a t 128-29. See Polish Nat'l Alliance of the United
States v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944).
The modern view of the expansive reach of the commerce power apparently was not
foreseen by Madison when he said: "The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power;
but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are
entertained." THE FEDERALIST
NO. 45, a t 329 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison). For a
further explanation of Madison's views see notes 234-237 and accompanying text infra.
115. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d a t 259.
116. See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d a t 838.
117. Professor Charles C. Black's interpretation of judicial decisions up to 1970 lead
him to the following conclusion about the existence of an implied constitutional limit to
federal powers:
Here is one of the most important questions conceivable with respect to the
legal basis of federalism. Is there an implied limitation on the federal powers,
to the effect they shall not be used to deal with some matters under state
authority? The prevalent modern answer is negative.
C. BLACK,PERSPECTIVES
I N CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 25 (1970). Cf. Strong, Cooperative
Federalism, 23 IOWAL. REV.459, 474 (1938).
118. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
119. U.S. CONST.amend. X.
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Until the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Darby,120states argued that the Tenth Amendment explicitly limits congressional exercise of the commerce power.'21 In Darby,
however, the Court dismissed this argument, reasoning that
"[tlhe amendment states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered. "lZ2
In spite of the decision in Darby, states have argued that the
Tenth Amendment is evidence of an implicit constitutional limit
to the commerce power; that the amendment, by recognizing the
essential role of the states in the federal system, implicitly prohibits federal action which unduly impairs the ability of the
states to effectively function as sovereign units in that system. To
date, the Supreme Court has not clearly explained whether there
is such an implicit constitutional limit to the commerce power.I2"
Even if the judiciary does recognize the existence of a Tenth
Amendment limit to the commerce power, the courts still face the
difficult task of defining the scope of that limit. In past cases,
states have sought to define the scope by claiming immunity from
congressional regulation pursuant to the commerce power for
"governmental, " "essential governmental, " and "sovereign"
functions, but each of these formulations of the limit to the commerce power has been disapproved by the Supreme Court.I2.'

B. Past Supreme Court Decisions
The circuit courts' analysis of the constitutional issues fo120. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 106 (1941); Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46, 90-91 (1906).
122. 312 U.S. a t 124. The Third Circuit apparently felt that this language in Darby
negated any constitutional argument based on the Tenth Amendment as a limit to federal
powers. See notes 144-148 and accompanying text infra.
123. The importance of this inquiry was recognized by the district court in Maryland
v. Wirtz, 269 F. Supp. 826, 849 (D. Md. 1967), aff 'd, 392 U.S. 183 (1968): "If the concept
of federalism is to survive, it must stand on constitutional limitations, not on the sufferance of the federal government." But see Wechsler, Political Safeguards of Fed~ralism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Gouerment, 54
L. REV.543, 544 (1954):
COLUM.
National action has always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an
intrusion to be justified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary
case. This point of view cuts even deeper than the concept of the central government as one of granted, limited authority, articulated in the Tenth Amendment.
124. The "governmental" argument was rejected in New York v. United States, 326
U.S. 572, 583 (1945). The "essential" state function argument was rejected in Case v.
Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946). The "sovereignty" argument was rejected by United
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183-85 (1936). For a discussion of these various formulaL. REV.750, 770-71 (1968).
tions and their ultimate disposition see 66 MICH.
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cused primarily on past Supreme Court cases which held that
federal statutes regulating the activities of private parties could
constitutionally be extended to similar state activities. The Administrator's interpretation of the Clean Air Act amendments
would, unlike the federal regulation dealt with in these Supreme
Court cases, require each state to use its resources in administering a federally promulgated regulatory scheme. A major consideration to each circuit court, then, was the significance of this factual difference.

Supreme Court statements appear to recognize no limits to
the commerce power

1.

The first cases dealing with the proper accommodation of
states' rights in the federal system arose when the federal government began to tax various state activities. In confronting the
federalism issue, the Supreme Court recognized that states do
have some protection against the federal taxing power.12sEarly
cases held that the states were immune from taxation by the
federal government when acting in their governmental capacity,
but not immune when engaged in proprietary a ~ t i v i t i e s . ~ * V h e n
state governments sought this same immunity from the commerce power, however, the judiciary was not persuaded. In
United States v. C a l i f ~ r n i arelied
, ~ ~ ~upon by the Administrator,
Congress sought to bring a state-owned railroad within the scope
of the Safety Appliance Act passed under the aegis of the commerce clause. The states argued that operation of the railroad was
a governmental function and therefore immune from federal regulation. Addressing this argument, the Court said:
[W]e think it unimportant to say whether the state conducts
its railroad in its "sovereign" or in its "private" capacity. That
in operating its railroad it is acting within a power reserved to
the states cannot be doubted. . . . [But] [tlhe sovereign
power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of
grants of power to the federal government in the Constituti~n.'~~
125. The source of the federal taxing power is U.S. CONST.art. I, $ 8, cl. 1: "The
Congress shall have Power to Lay and collect Taxes . . . ."
126. See, e.g., Allen v. Regents, 304 U S . 439,451-53 (1938); Helvering v. Powers, 293
U.S. 214, 227 (1934); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360,369 (1934); South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437, 447 (1905).
127. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
128. Id. at 183-84. One commentator believes that the result in United States u.
California, although justifiable when decided in 1936, is no longer applicable for two
reasons: (1) the Supreme Court did not perceive the dangerous destructive potential of
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This language in United States v. California influenced the
~ ~ arose when Congress
Court in Maryland u. W i r t ~ . lWirtz
amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to apply to the operation
of state-owned hospitals and schools. Maryland argued that this
action was not permissible under the commerce clause because
the commerce power could not be used to interfere with governmental functions. The Court found this argument untenable, reasoning that state concerns cannot " 'outweigh' the importance of
an otherwise valid federal statute regulating c~mmerce."'~Witing
United States v. California, the Court in Wirtz concluded that
"[ilf a State is engaging in economic activities that are validly
regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in by private
persons, the State too may be forced to conform its activities to
federal regulation. "I3'
Because of the broad language in United States u. California
cited with approval in Maryland v. Wirtz, it is possible to conclude that no constitutional limit, express or implied, constrains
congressional exercise of the commerce power. Only language in
Fry v. United States,132the most recent Supreme Court case dealing with the constitutional issues here involved, specifically refers
to a constitutional limitation to the commerce power.'" In dictum, the Court in Fry refers to the Tenth Amendment as declar-

-

the commerce power, and (2) the tax immunity doctrine "hinged on the muddled distincL. REV.380, 383-84
tion between 'governmental' and 'proprietary' activities." 53 TEXAS
(1975). See also Fry v. United States, 421 U S . 542, 553-56 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). In Maryland v. Wirtz, the Fair Labor Standards Act was
extended to state-owned schools and hospitals. The Court, however, made it clear that
the intrusion into state medical and educational functions was minimal:
Thus appellants' characterization of the question in this case as whether Congress may, under the guise of the commerce power, tell the states how to perform
medical and educational functions is not factually accurate. Congress has "interfered with" these state functions only to the extent of providing that when a
State employs people in performing such functions it is subject to the same
restrictions as a wide range of other employers whose activities affect commerce,
including privately operated schools and hospitals,
Id. a t 133-94.
130. Id. a t 195-96.
131. Id. a t 197.
132. 421 U.S. 542 (1975). In Fry, the Court upheld the application of the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970 to the state's employees.
133. The Court in Maryland v. Wirtz said "[tlhe Court has ample power to prevent
what the appellants purport to fear, 'the utter destruction of the state as a sovereign
political entity.' " 392 U.S. at 196. The Court, however, does not cite any authority for
this proposition, nor state whether the Court's power is derived from the Constitution. For
the circuit courts' discussion of the quoted language see notes 155-161 and accompanying
text infra.
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ing "the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise
power in a fashion that impairs the states' integrity or their ability to furwtion effectively in a federal system."'34
In summary, then, only one of the Supreme Court cases involving constitutional issues present here has mentioned a constitutional limit to the federal commerce power, the authority by
which the Administrator of the EPA sought to regulate the states'
activities. lS5
2.

T h e Fourth and N i n t h Circuits distinguish the cases

In spite of the holdings in the previously discussed Supreme
Court cases, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits determined that those
cases are consistent with the concept of a limitation to the commerce power. Essentially, the courts reasoned that the decisions
in United States v. California and Maryland v. Wirtz only apply
when the state activities subject to federal regulation are similar
to those carried on by private parties.136For example, the Ninth
Circuit in Brown cites Justice Harlan's statement in Wirtz that
"the Court has ample power to prevent . . . the utter destruction
of the state as a sovereign political entity" as recognizing this
distinction. 13'
Indeed, the Court in Wirtz did qualify the language in United
134. 421 U.S. a t 547 n.7. The Court prefaced the quoted language dealing with the
Tenth Amendment by this statement:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a "truism," stating
merely that "all is retained which has not been surrendered," . . . it is not
without significance.
Id.
In addition to the dictum in Fry v. United States, individual justices of the Supreme
Court have recognized the existence of a constitutional limit to the federal commerce
power. Justice Douglas said: "But what is done here is nonetheless such a serious invasion
of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is in my view not consistent with our constitutional federalism." Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Fry v. United States, criticized the following broad
language in United States u. California: "The state can no more deny the power if its
exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an individual," 297 U.S. at 185.
According to Justice Rehnquist, "[sluch an answer is simply a denial of the inherent
affirmative constitutional limitation on congressional power which I believe the States
possess." 421 U.S. a t 553.
135. In spite of the fact that the statement in Fry was only dictum contained in a
footnote to the Court's opinion, the case appears to have had a significant impact on the
circuit courts' holdings. The only decision to completely reject a state's constitutional
argument, the Third Circuit's opinion in Pennsylvania v. EPA, was decided prior to Fry,
while the other three cases were decided subsequently.
136. See note 233 infra.
137. 521 F.2d a t 839.
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States v. California by interpreting the case as standing for the
proposition that "if a State is engaging in economic activities that
are validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged
i n by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its
~ ~addition, in Parden v. Teractivities to federal r e g ~ l a t i o n . " 'In
minal Railway,139the Court reiterated the principle announced in
United States v. California, but limited the effect of that language by concluding that "when a state leaves the sphere that is
exclusively its own, and enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if
it were a private person or corporation."14o
Although the Court in United States v. California and
Parden u. Terminal Railway spoke in absolute terms of sovereign
powers being diminished, it is evident from the Court's conclusion in the latter case that the federal government may regulate
only activities that are not exclusively a state's own. While this
conclusion does not obviously follow from the broad principles
announced in United States v. California and Maryland v. Wirtz,
it is consistent with the holdings in those casest41and does provide
a logical explanation for the Court's continued references to limits on the commerce power.
C. T h e Circuits' Analysis of the Constitutional Issues
The states' main constitutional argument was that the Tenth
Amendment evidences an implicit constitutional limit to the federal commerce power which the Administrator has exceeded. The
response of the circuits to this argument is a major point of difference in their opinions.
1. T h e Third Circuit rejects Pennsylvania's constitutional
argument

Because past Supreme Court decisions have cast substantial
doubt on the existence of a constitutional limit to the commerce
power,142it is not surprising that Pennsylvania did not even argue
138. 392 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added).
139. 377 U.S. 184 (1964). In Parden, the Court agreed to extend the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) to the states. Cf. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
140. 377 U.S.at 196 (emphasis added).
141. Both the ownership and operation of the railroad in United States o. California
and the ownership and operation of schools and hospitals in Maryland u. Wirtz are activities engaged in by both public and private entities. See note 167 infra.
142. See notes 120-122, 127-134 and accompanying text supra.
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that the Tenth Amendment limits federal exercise of the commerce power.'" Despite this omission, the court in Pennsylvania
v. EPA dealt with the Tenth Amendment issue,i44quoting the
1946 Supreme Court case of Case v. B o ~ l e s ' ~ Q dismissing
s
any
constitutional argument based on the amendment: "[Tlhe
Tenth Amendment does not operate as a limitation upon the
powers, express or implied,14"elegated to the national government."14' The Court in Case v. Bowles derived this principle from
United States v. D a r b ~ . " ~
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's recent reference in Fry to
the important constitutional role of the Tenth Amendment illustrates the error in the Third Circuit's reasoning that Darby and
Case v. Bowles negated the amendment's significance. In apparent reference to Darby, the Court in Fry stated that:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a
"truism" . . . it is not without significance. The Amendment
expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity
or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.t49

The Court's use of the word "expressly" is clearly not an attempt
to overrule Darby, which rejected the argument that the Tenth
Amendment expressly limits the federal commerce power. The
Court in Fry reasoned that the amendment's significance is in
143. While it is understandable that Pennsylvania would not base its constitutional
argument on the Tenth Amendment, it may have been a tactical error not to do so. Had
the state conceded that the literal wording of the Tenth Amendment does not limit the
commerce power, yet argued that the amendment does implicitly limit federal powers, the
Third Circuit could not have dismissed the state's constitutional argument by simple
reference to Case u. Bowles. See notes 142-150 and accompanying text infra.
144. 500 F.2d a t 259 n.20.
145. 327 U.S. 92 (1946).
146. I t is important to note that the Court's reference here to "powers express or
implied" is not relevant to the issue of whether the Tenth Amendment acts as an "express
or implied" limitation to the commerce power. When the Court says that the Tenth
Amendment does not limit express or implied powers delegated to the federal government,
it is referring to the origin of the federal power sought to be limited, in this case the federal
commerce power, which is an express power delegated to the federal government.
147. 327 U.S. a t 102. The Court quotes Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340,362 (1945),
which cites United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. a t 123-24, for the proposition.
148. Confusion as to the meaning of the Tenth Amendment has arisen because of the
Llarby Court's reference to the Tenth Amendment as a "truism." 312 U.S. a t 124. In that
case, however, the Court merely rejected the appellee's argument that "the Tenth Amendment expressly stipulates that certain powers are reserved to the people." Id. at 106.
Therefore, since Darby it has generally been considered futile to argue that the literal
wording of the Tenth Amendment limits the commerce power.
149. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
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expressly declaring constitutional policy. This policy of protecting the states' integrity is not explicitly contained in the Constitution but is implicitly derived from the Constitution's establishment of a federal system with independent states. The Tenth
Amendment "expressly" recognizes this concept of separate state
existence by reference to powers reserved to the states.15o
Not only did the court in Pennsylvania u. EPA dispose of any
possible argument based on the Tenth Amendment, but the court
also rejected the state's argument that the Administrator's interpretation of the Act would "pose an unconstitutional threat to the
sovereignty of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."'~In an apparent belief that the Tenth Amendment was not a viable argument, the state cited no provision of the Constitution to support
its contention but instead relied on past Supreme Court cases
dealing with limits to the federal taxing power. The circuit court
in Pennsylvania v. EPA acknowledged that the Supreme Court
has upheld a state sovereignty argument in cases dealing with the
scope of the federal taxing power but rejected Pennsylvania's
sovereign state function argument,'" primarily by its interpretation of Maryland v. Wirtz, which it claimed rejected a similar
a r g ~ r n e n t ? The
~ Third Circuit broadly interpreted the case as
standing for the "principle that the constitutionality of federal
regulation of state activities is subject to the same analysis as
that of private activities; viz. the determinative factor is simply
150. California, apparently influenced by Fry, conceded the point made in Darby,
but argued that the purpose of the Tenth Amendment supports its argument: "While the
Tenth Amendment did not establish a new constitutional principle, its clear purpose was
to solidify the position of state governments as sovereign within their sphere." Brief for
Petitioner a t 14, Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975); see Strong, Cooperative
L. REV.459, 469-70 (1938). But see CORWIN,
NATIONAL
SUPREMACY
485
Federalism, 23 IOWA
(1913) for the view that the supremacy clause negatives any theory of implied limitations
on congressional power arising out of the fact of a divided government.
151. Brief for Petitioner a t 28, Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974)
(heading in petitioner's brief).
152. Pennsylvania argued that United States u. California and Maryland v. Wirtz
control only when states engage in activities which are also carried on by private entities.
Relying primarily on Justice Frankfurter's opinion in New York v. United States, the state
argued that "[s]urely there could be no activity which is more definitely a governmental
activity, no activity which is more clearly an attribute of sovereignty, than enforcement
of law." Id. a t 29.
153. 500 F.2d a t 259-60. The Third Circuit said that Pennsylvania derived its sovereign state functions argument from Justice Frankfurter's language in New York v. United
States, 326 U S . 572 (1946). The court discredits Justice Frankfurter's remarks primarily
for two reasons: (1) Justice Frankfurter only delivered the opinion for a plurality of the
Court; (2) the Court has held that "the standards developed to define the boundaries of
state immunity from federal taxation are inapplicable to federal regulation of state activities under the Commerce Clause." 500 F.2d a t 261-62.
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whether they have an impact on interstate commerce.77154
Based on its review of precedent, the Ninth Circuit in Brown
v. EPA criticized the Third Circuit's interpretation of Wirtz as
failing to recognize the difference between a state engaging in
commerce and a state regulating the commerce of others (governance of commerce). 1 5 T 0 the Ninth Circuit, California's
"governance of the use of highways and automobiles" is outside
the scope of the federal power, whereas the state's use of the
highways is not.15This crucial distinction, stated the court, was
recognized by Chief Justice Hughes in his statement that "the
subject of federal power is still 'commerce,' [and not governance] and not all commerce but commerce with foreign nations
and among the several States."157The Ninth Circuit also believed
that language in Justice Harlan's opinion in Maryland v. Wirtz
recognized the distinction. Justice Harlan quoted Chief Justice
Hughes' statement and added t h a t "[tlhe Court has ample
power to prevent 'the utter destruction of the state as a sovereign
political entity.' "15R
The Third Circuit in Pennsylvania v. EPA, however, did not
review these statements as recognizing a significant limit to the
commerce power. To the court, Chief Justice Hughes' language
did nothing more than reaffirm "that the power to regulate commerce is limited to activities that affect interstate or foreign commerce."lB The Third Circuit reasoned that this fact, plus the
caution that "Congress may not use a relatively trivial impact on
commerce as an excuse for broad, general regulation of state or
private activities," led the Supreme Court in Maryland v. Wirtz
to its conclusion that "the Court has ample power to prevent. . .
the utter destruction of the state as a sovereign political
entity."160
Following the Third Circuit's reasoning, the Court's ample
power to protect the state can only be exercised if the state activities either do not affect interstate commerce a t all or have only -a
trivial impact on commerce. Under the Supreme Court's present
expansive interpretation of the commerce clause, it is not likely
that many federal actions would be limited by the Third Circuit's
154. Id. at 261.
155. 521 F.2d at 838 n.45; see notes 166-173and accompanying text infra.
156. 521 F.2d at 838.
157. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 US.453, 466 (1938).
158. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U S . 183, 196 (1968).
159. 500 F.2d a t 260.
160. Id.
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view of the Court's "ample power."161 Fortunately for the states,
Pennsylvania v. EPA was the only one of the circuits' decisions
to completely reject the states' constitutional arguments.

T h e Fourth and N i n t h Circuits favor the states'
constitutional arguments

2.

The three circuits that recognized the existence of a constitutional limit to the commerce power were necessarily confronted
with the problem of defining the scope of that limit. In the absence of any clear statement by the Supreme Court on the issue,
it is not surprising that the courts reached different conclusions.
The Fourth Circuit in Maryland v. E P A recognized that
some type of linedrawing was desirable and turned for assistance
to Justice Frankfurter's discussion in New York v. United States
concerning the limits of federal powers. Justice Frankfurter, although recognizing the constraints of the Tenth Amendment on
federal powers, rejected the state's contention that its governmental functions were immune from federal taxation.lfi2Nevertheless, he did recognize that a narrower class of state activities
were immune from federal taxation. The Fourth Circuit quoted
with approval Justice Frankfurter's comment that federal powers
do not extend to "State activities and State-owned property that
partake of uniqueness from the point of view of intergovernmental relations."lm Having determined that some unique state
--

161. See note 114 supra.
162. New York v. United States, 326 U S . 572, 580 (1946).
163. Id. a t 582. The Third Circuit, however, rejected Justice Frankfurter's language,
reasoning that the limits imposed on the federal taxing power do not apply to the federal
commerce power. See note 153 supra. The Third Circuit's assertion is correct in that the
Court in United States u. California did reject the taxing power analogy as applied to the
commerce power. For this reason, then, the decision in New York u. United States would
have no binding precedental effect on lower courts dealing with issues involving limits to
the commerce power. Nevertheless, Justice Frankfurter's statements, although dicta, were
not confined to the federal taxing power. Justice Frankfurter argued that the taxing power
should be interpreted as broadly as was the commerce power in United States u.
California. This is evident by his rejection of the governmental v. proprietary distinction
plus his statement that the taxing power has no less reach than the commerce power.
Justice Frankfurter's point of view, then, was similar t o the Court's in United States u.
California. Both rejected the governmental v. proprietary distinction and both viewed the
congressional power involved as expansive. In this context, it would seem that Justice
Frankfurter's comments do apply to the commerce clause.
The Third Circuit summarized Justice Frankfurter's reasoning that certain unique
state activities are immune from federal taxation as concluding that the federal taxing
power is limited to "nondiscriminatory" taxes. 500 F.2d a t 261 n.23. The Third Circuit
claims that four members of the Court in New York v. United States rejected Justice
Frankfurter's reasoning. Id. Analysis of Justice Stone's concurrence, however, shows that
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activities cannot be regulated by the federal government, the
court then quoted language in In re Duncan1" proclaiming the
essential nature of a state legislature's right to pass or not to pass
laws TO the Fourth Circuit, then, an implicit constitutional
limit to the commerce power does exist, can be defined, and was
exceeded by the EPA.
Justice Frankfurter's reference to "unique state activities,"
cited with approval by the Fourth Circuit in Maryland u. EPA,
appears similar to the Ninth Circuit's position that the federal
commerce power does not extend to a state's governance of commerce. The Fourth Circuit only identifies one unique governmental function, the right of the state's legislature to pass or not to
pass laws. The Ninth Circuit's concept of governance, however,
includes some or all of a state's police powers, although the distinction between a state's economic activities and the exercise of
its police power over these activities is not clearly explained.lfi6
The court illustrates its theory by reasoning that a state's operation of a railroad is an "economic activity indistinguishable from
that of private parties," whereas its exercise of the police power
over the use of highways and automobiles is governance.
This example is used to contrast the facts in United States
u. California with those of Brown u. EPA.16' But the Third Circuit
even though these four members of the Court did not accept an analysis based on discrimination, they did accept a concept of constitutionally protected state sovereignty. Moreover, it appears that the four concurring justices' view of the scope of constitutional protection extended to sovereign state activities that were not discriminatory. These justices
indicated that a nondiscriminatory tax may nonetheless be unlawful if it burdens sovereign state activities. Id. a t 586-87; see Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 555-56 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
164. 139 U.S. 449 (1891).
165. 8 ENVIR.
REP. DEC.a t 1112, quoting In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891):
By the Constitution, a republican form of government is guaranteed to
every State in the Union, and the distinguishing feature of that form is the right
of the people to choose their own officers for governmental administration, and
pass their own laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative
bodies.
166. The Ninth Circuit explains that a state's exercise of its police power with respect
to an economic activity which affects commerce is "governance." The court then contrasts
a state's governance with "an economic activity indistinguishable from that of private
parties." The court appears to say that governance does not include economic activities
which affect interstate commerce. However, many exercises of the police power (governance) are economic activities which affect interstate commerce. The Ninth Circuit's
concept of governance, then, is probably limited to a narrow range of police power activities which cannot be termed economic activities. See note 172 infra.
167. 521 F.2d a t 838. The Third Circuit in Pennsylvania v. EPA saw as a close analogy
to the situation before it "a state-owned railway system created and maintained for use
by private railway companies." 500 F.2d a t 261 n.22. The court concluded that Congress
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in Pennsylvania v. EPA argued that the only difference in the two
sets of facts is historical: railroads are operated by public and
private concerns and automotive transportation systems are operated only by state and local governments.lMTo the Third Circuit
this difference is irrelevantY The Ninth Circuit would probably
agree that the difference in the operation or ownership of a given
economic activity is irrelevant but argue that whether the state
governs the activity's use through exercise of its police power is
entirely relevant. Even if private enterprises operated automotive
transportation systems, the state would still govern their use by
enacting and enforcing traffic laws. Clearly, these activities
would be characterized by the Ninth Circuit as governance of
commerce and hence immune from federal intervention.
From this analysis, it is evident that both the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits believe that any federal regulation which forces
the states to pass laws is impermissible. The Ninth Circuit's position, however, appears to extend protection to state administrative functions encompassed by the state police power.170The
scope of the Fourth Circuit's unique governmental activity testI7l
could require the "state to operate it in such a way as to deal with a problem, like safety
or air pollution which affects interstate commerce." Id.
The Ninth Circuit's governance test would probably lead to the same conclusion. A
state as an owner and operator of the railroad system would be subject to the same
congressional regulation of its economic activities as would a private owner and operator
of railroads. However, under the Ninth Circuit's analysis, the state's regulation of the use
of its railroads and the railroads of others through enacting and enforcing laws would be
governance. This conclusion is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the state
activities regulated by Congress in Maryland v . Wirtz and Fry u. United States. The Ninth
Circuit says "[tlhese cases establish that the payment of wages by states to certain types
of state employees is an economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce
and is thus subject to those regulations imposed by Congress which were then before the
Court." 521 F.2d a t 838 (emphasis added). The state would not exercise "its police power
with respect to an economic activity which affects commerce" when it acts as an employer
in the payment of wages, nor would it as the owner and operator of a railroad.
168. 500 F.2d a t 261.
169. Id.
170. A state's power to provide for the general welfare (police power) is broad indeed.
As the Third Circuit indicates, Pennsylvania's compliance with the Administrator's plan
would "require the Commonwealth to exercise its legislative and administrative powers."
500 F.2d a t 262 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit's governance test, based on the
police power, apparently encompasses not only legislative functions, but certain administrative functions as well.
171. The Fourth Circuit focused on the "unique" right of a state to pass or not to
pass laws. The court does not say whether other state activities would be protected from
federal regulation. Nevertheless, the court derived its theory from Justice Frankfurter
who, from his examples given of "unique" state activities, apparently intended the class
of protected activities to be quite narrow. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572,
582 ( 1946).
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and the Ninth Circuit's governance test are not clearly delimited.172Nevertheless, both tests, without reversing prior precedent, operate to make only a narrow class of state activities immune from congressional regulation pursuant to the commerce
power.
3. District of Columbia Circuit

Like the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the D.C. Circuit in
District of Columbia u. Train recognized a limit on congressional
exercise of the commerce power and attempted to define its
scope. In so doing, the court appeared to take an intermediate
position on the constitutional issues between the Third Circuit on
one hand and the Fourth and Ninth Circuits on the other.174Primarily relying on language in Wirtz,the court concluded:
Once Congress has properly determined that the emission
of pollutants into the air has an effect on interstate commerce,
it has power to regulate activities which generate that pollution
either directly or indirectly, and it is irrelevant that a particular
source of pollution is operated by the state.'75

Based on this reasoning, the D.C. Circuit apparently went
beyond the approach taken by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits by
allowing Congress to regulate the state's streets, highways, and
bus systems. Specifically, the court concluded that Congress can
require the states to purchase buses and to construct exclusive
bus lanes even a t great expense.176To the D.C. Circuit, then, the
172. The scope of the Ninth Circuit's governance test is also unclear. See note 166
supra. Even though the court defines governance in broad terms of police power regulation, California argued that only those state activities which cannot in principle be performed by private parties are protected from commerce power regulation. The only example of this class of activities given by California is the enactment and enforcement of state
laws. Brief for Petitioner a t 22, Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975).
173. See notes 127-134 and accompanying text supra.
174. The D.C. Circuit in District of Columbia u. Train did not refer to either the
Fourth or Ninth Circuit decisions. The reason for this omission is not known as both the
Ninth and Fourth Circuit opinions came down prior to District of Colombia v. Train; the
Ninth Circuit's opinion is dated August 15, 1975; the Fourth Circuit's, September 19,
1975; and the D.C. Circuit's, October 28, 1975. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit's opinion,
rendered a little over a month after the Ninth Circuit's, cites Brown v. EPA as support
for its views of the constitutional issues. 8 ENVIR.REP. DEC.a t 1113.
As the D.C. Circuit cited the Third Circuit's opinion several times, 521 F.2d a t 988,
991, 994, 994 n.7, i t is logical to assume that the court was unaware of the Ninth and
Fourth Circuit decisions when drafting its opinion.
175. 521 F.2d a t 989.
176. Id. The court realized that the purchase of 475 buses and the construction of
many miles of exclusive bus lanes may be financially burdensome, but found it permissible based on the following language from the Supreme Court's decision in Employees of
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rationale of United States v. California and Wirtz extends to
allow apparently unlimited regulation of state activities that directly or indirectly17' affect interstate commerce.
The court next addressed the Administrator's inspection and
maintenance regulations and his retrofit regulation^.'^^ In contrast to the bus and bus lane provisions, these regulations are
ultimately aimed at the individual automobile owner, not the
state. Furthermore, as the court recognized, "each federallypromulgated regulation includes provisions ordering the states to
enact statutes and to establish and administer programs to force
~ ~analyztheir citizens to comply with this federal d i r e ~ t i v e . " 'In
ing the constitutionality of these various regulations, the court
determined that the proper standard of inquiry was developed by
Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden when he said that the
federal commerce power was a "power to regulate; that is, to
prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed."lU0
the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U S .
279, 284 (1973): "[Wlhen Congress does act [under the commerce power] it may place
new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the States."
In that case, employees of Missouri sought overtime pay due them under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, which was applied t o the states by Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183 (1968). Missouri argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred suit against it in federal
court. The Supreme Court upheld the state's argument, 411 U S . a t 286-87. The quoted
statement, then, appears to be dictum. In addition, the Supreme Court neither cites
authority for this statement nor explains its scope. I t is not clear, then, whether the
language means the cost to a state of complying with a federal program is irrelevant or
whether there is a point at which the financial burdens become too enormous to be
allowed.
177. The Administrator defines an indirect source as
one that encourages mobile source pollution a t locations not necessarily coincident with the source itself by serving a s a trip attraction for automobile drivers,
or which provides a parking or driving convenience.
38 Fed. Reg. 30,632 (1973). The Administrator lists a "high-speed highway" as an example
of an indirect source of pollution controlled by the state. Id.
178. The EPA's retrofit regulations require certain vehicles to be equipped with mechanical devices, or in other ways altered, in order to reduce the emission of air pollutants.
For examples of such regulations see, e.g., the EPA's plan for the District of Columbia,
40 C.F.R. § § 54.492, .494-96 (1974); and the EPA's retrofit regulations for Virginia, 40
C.F.R. §§ 52.2446-47 (1974).
179. 521 F.2d a t 990.
180. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824). The language quoted by the court precedes
Marshall's famous statement that "[tlhis power, like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
other than are prescribed in the constitution." Id.
By focusing on the meaning of the word "regulate," the court takes an unusual
approach to the problem of defining the limits of the congressional power to "regulate
commerce." Most of the previous efforts a t approaching the problem have focused on the
definition of "commerce." For example, the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the problem
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Applying this standard, the court reasoned that Congress has
authority to force the states to administer federally promulgated
plans if the federal plan is directed to traditional state activities
like registering and licensing motor vehicles.lR1To the court, this
is valid congressional regulation of commerce. Nevertheless, the
court struck down the inspection and retrofit requirements that
do not involve such traditional functions but go beyond valid
regulation by forcing the states to enact statutes and become
involved in "administering the details of the regulatory
scheme."182
It appears that the court in District of Columbia u. Train
used the "regulation" test to accomplish the same result it feels
is not justified solely by reliance on the Tenth Amendment. Although the court cited with approval the language in Fry referring
to the important constitutional role of the Tenth Amendment,
the court correctly points out that "[tlhe [Supreme] Court has
not yet made clear exactly what sort of restraints the Tenth
Amendment does place on federal action under the commerce
clause."183Because of this, the court's conclusion from its analysis
of Wirtz and Fry was an "additional ground" for setting aside the
inspection and retrofit regulations.lS4The same factors that led
the court to conclude that the inspection and maintenance regulations are a drastic invasion of state sovereignty prohibited by
the Tenth Amendment led the court to conclude that these provisions go beyond valid regulation of commerce.185In either case,
the degree of federal intrusion was the focal point of the court's
analysis. By reaching the desired result through a restrictive definition of regulation, the D.C. Circuit obscured its reasoning.
distinguished between "governance" and "commerce," but did not question the meaning
of the word "regulate." 521 F.2d at 838-39.
181. 521 F.2d a t 991. The court was careful to point out the reasoning which led to
its decision to allow the Administrator to control state licensing activities:
[Tlhe federal regulation is directly related to existing activities presently being
carried on by the states, and it does not specify the manner in which the state
is to comply. A state may comply with the prohibition on registering nonconforming vehicles merely by requiring applicants for vehicle registration to submit a certificate of compliance obtained from federal officials or from private
sources not manned by state personnel.
Id. a t 991-92.
182. Id. at 992.
183. Id. at 993.
184. Id. at 994.
185. Id. a t 992.
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A comparison of the three tests

4.

The approach taken by the D.C. Circuit should be contrasted
with the Ninth Circuit's governance test. As previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit in Brown u. EPA illustrated its governance theory by contrasting the facts in United States u.
California with those of the instant case. la To the court in Brown
u. EPA, the state's operation of a railroad, an "economic activity
indistinguishable from that of private parties," is very much different from a state's exercise of its police power to govern the use
In contrast, the court in District
of highways and a~tornobi1es.l~~
of Columbia u. Train views "state-owned transportation systems
a s analogous to the railroad operated by the state in United
States u. C a l i f ~ r n i a . " ~ ~ Tanalogy
his
is used by the court to support its decision to uphold the Administrator's regulations which
require the states to purchase buses, construct bus lanes, and
regulate the registration of noncomplying vehicles.
The Ninth Circuit's governance test probably would not
allow these provisions. The federal plan promulgated by the
Administrator for California contained several bus lane provisionsl" and a prohibition against registering noncomplying vehi~les.~~"ll of these provisions were struck down by the Ninth
Circuit in Brown based on its interpretation of the Clean Air
Act.lS1The court's view of the constitutionality of these regulations appears to parallel its conclusions based on construction of
the Act.lg2
Clearly, the registration and licensing of vehicles is an exer-

-

-

186. See note 167 and accompanying text supra.
187. 521 F.2d at 838.
188. 521 F.2d at 989.
189. For example, the exclusive bus lane provisions for the San Diego Intrastate Air
Quality Control Region, 40 C.F.R. 6 52.258 (1974), and those for the Los Angeles Region,
40 C.F.R. 6 52.263 (1974).
190. 40 C.F.R. 6 52.244(d) (1974).
191. 521 F.2d at 831-32.
192. The Ninth Circuit discussed the constitutional issues at some length. From the
court's favorable attitude toward the state's arguments and its rejection of the Administrator's position, 521 F.2d at 837-39, it appears the court's view of the constitutional issues
would lead it to the same result as its holding based on interpretation of the statute which
struck down the exclusive bus lane and vehicle registration provisions. In reference to the
Third Circuit's decision, the court said:
We recognize that our views both with regard to the interpretation of the
Clean Air Act and the constitutional issues here discussed differ from those
expressed in Pennsylvania v. Environmental Protection Agency, 500 F.2d 246
(3d Cir. 1974).
521 F.2d a t 838 n.45 (emphasis added).
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cise of the state's police power and not an economic activity indistinguishable from that of private parties. It is not as clear, however, that the construction of exclusive bus lanes and the purchase of new buseslg3constitute "the governance of the use of
highways and automobiles." Arguably, the construction of exclusive bus lanes is governance and not commerce since the highways involved are owned solely by the state.lg4Yet the actual
physical activity required, construction of roads, is also to some
degree "an economic activity indistinguishable from that of private parties" in the sense that private parties can and do construct roads.lg5In that respect, construction of roads is analogous
to state ownership of a railroad treated in United States v.
California and would fall within the rationale of that case as
explained in Wirtz: "If a State is engaging in economic activities
that are validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its activities to federal regulation."lg6
In Maryland v. EPA, the Fourth Circuit recognized that a
state's right to pass or not to pass laws was a unique state activity
and therefore not subject to federal regulation. Although apparently not basing its decision on constitutional considerations, the
court held that the EPA could not "require Maryland to establish
the programs and furnish legal authority for the administration
thereof."lg7The court thereby set aside the entire inspection and
maintenance program and retrofit programs, including the licensing provisions. lg8
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit allowed the licensing provisions,
although setting aside the majority of the EPA's inspection,
maintenance, and retrofit programs. In so doing, the court admitted that because of its approach, "the states may have to enact
193. There is no provision in the EPA's plan for California requiring that state to
purchase buses. See 40 C.F.R. $0 52.220 et seq. (1974).
194. The Third Circuit, based on its argument that historical circumstances resulted
in state and local governments monopolizing control over local automobile transportation
systems and not over railways, would seemingly reject this argument. See Pennsylvania
v. EPA, 500 F.2d a t 261 and notes 167-169 and accompanying text supra.
195. In Brown v. EPA, the state argued that state activities which cannot in principle
be performed by private parties are protected from federal regulation. See note 172 supra.
Based on this reasoning, the construction of exclusive bus lanes is probably not a protected
activity. Even though in fact the state alone will construct the bus lanes, in principle,
private parties also could construct such lanes.
196. 392 U S . a t 197.
197. 8 ENVIR.REP.DEC.a t 1114-15.
198. Id. at 1115.
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auxiliary statutes or state regulations to carry out the federal
regulation . . . . 199
There is no indication in Maryland v. EPA that the Fourth
Circuit's view of the constitutional issues would countenance
such an approach. The court set aside all of the EPA's regulations
that required the states to legislate. The presence of this one
objectionable feature was determinative to the Fourth Circuit. To
the D.C. Circuit in District of Columbia v. Train, however, federal regulations which require the state to enact some "auxiliary
statutes or state regulations" are permissible if certain other limiting factors are present.200
97

5.

The guarantee clause201

In two of the four circuits, the states presented a rather
unique constitutional argument in addition to arguing the Tenth
Amendment as evidence of an implicit constitutional limit to the
commerce power.202In Brown v. EPA, California argued that the
Administrator's interpretation of the Act would result in an
abridgment of the state's constitutional guarantee to a republican
form of government.203Essentially, California's argument was
that the federal government, by requiring a state to enforce federal plans, could exercise ever increasing control over state expenditures. This "severance of spending from taxing at the state
level" would seriously impair the state's republican form of government as the congressional representatives from other states
would "dilute the strength of the voters [of California] whose
argument,
revenues would be spent as Congress direct~."~~VI'his
199. 521 F.2d a t 987.
200. See note 181 supra and text accompanying notes 226-227 infra.
201. U.S. CONST.art. IV, § 4: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . ."
202. A guarantee clause argument was recognized by the courts in District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1975) and Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 838 (9th
Cir. 1975), but was addressed only by the Ninth Circuit.
203. 521 F.2d a t 838.
204. Id. The Ninth Circuit in Brown cited the writings of Montesquieu and the
Federalist papers in support of California's guarantee clause argument. Id. Madison in
The Federalist contrasts the theories of republicanism, nationalism and federalism. In
speaking of a republic Madison said:
[W]e may define a republic to be, or a t least may bestow that name on, a
government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great
body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during
pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a
government that it be derived from the great body of society . -. . .
THEFEDERALIST
NO. 39, a t 280-81 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Montesquieu simi-
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if successful, would give the state's federalism argument a constitutional basis.
a. General rule of nonjusticiability. Even though by article
IV, section 4 the federal government is responsible for guaranteeing to the states a republican form of government, the courts have
consistently held that questions arising under the guarantee
o sthese
t
clause are nonjusticiable political q u e ~ t i o n s . ~ ~ Wof
cases, however, involved alleged interference with a state's guarantee to a republican government by the state itself or individuals
within the state.206In contrast, in Brown v. EPA the threat to the
state's republican form of government was from congressional
and executive, not state or individual action. The federal government, the guarantor of the states' right to a republican government, was the very party accused of the violation.
larly spoke of the right of the people to elect their representatives as being the essence of
a republican form of government. 1 MONTESQUIEU'S
SPIRITOF LAWS8 (J. Pritchard rev. ed.
1902). It appears, then, that these two authorities would agree that dilution of the electorate's control over local fiscal matters would impair a state's republican form of government.
205. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223
U.S. 118 (1911); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). In Baker v. Carr, the Court
declared the guarantee clause claim to be nonjusticiable, but upheld the equal protection
argument based on the same facts. 369 U.S. a t 227, 237. For a further discussion of Baker
u. Carr see'note 207 infra.
The Ninth Circuit, while discussing the guarantee clause issue a t some length did not
mention the problem of nonjusticiability. Its failure to do so may be explained by the
court's merely giving its "opinion" of the constitutional issues while basing its decision
on statutory construction.
206. In the 1849 case of Luther v. Borden, the Supreme Court determined for the first
time that ehforcement of the guarantee clause was a nonjusticiable political question. The
case arose out of the Dorr Rebellion, a unique event in American history. In 1841, a group
of citizens in Rhode Island led by Dorr organized, adopted a new constitution, and claimed
to be the official government of the state. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide
which government would be recognized by the United States. Chief Justice Taney, in
refusing to pass on the question, reasoned that Congress was the proper branch of government to decide such political questions. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 43 (1849).
Even though the Court's treatment of the nonjusticiability issue in Borden appeared
to be dictum, the reasoning of the Court has been very influential to subsequent courts
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW55 (1972);
dealing with guarantee clause claims. See B. SCHWARTZ,
Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN.L. REV.485, 507
(1924).
In Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118,151 (1911), the Court refused
to decide a challenge to a 1902 amendment to the Oregon constitution which contained
the following provision:
But the people reserve to themselves power to propose laws and amendments
to the constitution and to enact or reject the same a t the polls, independent of
the legislative assembly, and also reserve power a t their own option to approve
or reject a t the polls any act of the legislative assembly.
ORE.CONST.art. 4, 8 1 (1902).
For a discussion of Baker u. Carr see note 207 infra.
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Even so, the Supreme Court has recently determined that
"challenges to congressional action on the ground of inconsistency with the [guarantee] clause present no justiciable quesThe Court based this conclusion primarily on its decision
ti~n."~"'
~
Georgia sued to enjoin execuin Georgia v. S t a n t ~ n . ~InOStanton,
tion of the Reconstruction Acts, alleging that enforcement of the
acts would destroy its present form of government209which it
claimed was republican in "every political, legal, constitutional,
and juridical sense."210The Court determined that the issue involved was a nonjusticiable political question .211 Thus, even in
this extreme case where the very existence of the state's government was jeopardized by federal action, the Court refused to hear
the state's guarantee clause claim.
b. Possible exception to the rule may support states'
arguments. It has been suggested that the Supreme Court case
of Coyle v. Smith212acts as a limitation upon the general rule of
-

-

207. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 224 (1962) (emphasis added). This case was a
landmark decision in the area of reapportionment. The appellants, residents of Tennessee,
were successful in arguing that their votes were "debased" because the state legislature
was not reapportioned after a substantial growth and redistribution in the state's population. Different members of the Court in Baker u. Carr expressed dissatisfaction with the
rule announced in Luther u. Borden. Justice Douglas took the strongest stance in opposition to a general application of the political question doctrine. He felt that many of the
cases cited by the Court as involving political questions were wrongly decided. 369 U.S.
a t 241 n.1. Specifically, he said that "[tlhe statements in Luther v. Borden, that this
guarantee is enforceable only by Congress or the Chief Executive is not maintainable."
Justice Douglas intimated that the doctrine arose out of a peculiar fact situation and that
its general application would therefore be inappropriate. Justice Douglas felt that the
doctrine was particularly inapplicable to voting rights cases where the Court has given
"the full panoply of judicial protection to voting rights." Id. a t 242 n.2.
Also, the dissent criticized the majority for their treatment of the issue. The majority
found that although the guarantee clause claim was not justiciable the appellants' equal
protection claim was. In response to this approach, Justice Frankfurter said in dissent:
"The present case involves all the elements that have made the Guarantee Clause cases
non-justiciable. It is in effect, a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different
label." Id. a t 297.
Even the majority made it clear that guarantee clause claims are only nonjusticiable
because they "involve those elements which define a 'political question.' " Id. a t 218. The
majority's review of precedent lists six of these elements, one of which must be present
for a given case to be ruled nonjusticiable. This process, said the Court, necessitates a
"discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of the particular case, and the
impossibility of resolution by any semantic cataloguing." Id. a t 217.
208. 73 U S . (6 Wall.) 50 (1867).
209. Id. a t 50-51. The Act of March 2, 1867, entitled "An act to provide for the more
efficient government of the rebel States," provided that no legal state government existed
in Georgia and until a government approved by Congress could be established the state
was to be part of a military district controlled by the President. Id.
210. Id. a t 65.
211. Id. a t 77.
212. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
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nonj~sticiability.~'~
In Coyle, the Court indicated that the guarantee clause may impose a duty on the federal government not
to deprive the states of their republican form of government. In
the case, Oklahoma challenged the validity of the Enabling Act
of June 16, 1906,214which restricted the power of the state to
determine the location of its capitol city, to determine when and
how to change the location, and to appropriate public funds for
that purpose. Noting that the powers limited by the Enabling Act
"are essentially and peculiarly state powers,"215the Court said
that the guarantee clause "may imply the duty of such new State
to provide itself with such State government, and impose upon
Congress the duty of seeing that such form is not changed to one
anti-republican-but it obviously does not confer power to admit
a new State which shall be any less a State than those which
compose the Union. "216
If the decision in Stanton can be limited to the unique historical circumstances involved,217the states in their case against the
EPA may fall within the rationale of the Court in C ~ y l e .In
~ 'both
~
instances, the states claimed that the actions of the federal government deprived them of powers that are uniquely theirs. In
Coyle, congressional action deprived a state from locating its own
center of government, from determining when and how to change
the location, and from appropriating public funds for that purpose. These functions were viewed by the Court as "essentially
- -

213. Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN.L. REV.
485, 510 (1924).
214. Ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267. These enabling acts varied from state to state. It is
interesting to note that Utah's contained a provision prohibiting plural marriage, which
many of the other state enabling acts did not. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 560 (1910).
215. 221 U S . a t 565.
216. Id. a t 567-68.
217. The Union, having been split by Civil War, sought once again to unite under a
common government. The existing government of Georgia, by refusing to grant the right
to vote to Negroes, was declared unrepublican in nature by Congress. Georgia's claim to
be a republican government in all respects certainly is not compelling to a society such
as ours today accustomed to universal suffrage.
218. Coyle u. Smith was cited by one commentator for the proposition that "[tlhere
are limitations on the scope of the things which can be accomplished under the guaranty
[sic] clause." Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN.
L. REV.485, 509 (1924). This statement suggests that the holding in Coyle may be limited
to cases where the federal government attempts to use the guarantee clause as authority
for some affirmative action. Although it is true that in Coyle Congress cited the guarantee
clause to justify its legislation, the absence of an affirmative use of the guarantee clause
here should not distinguish the circuit cases from Coyle. The ultimate impact on the states
in each instance is similar, for in both instances federal action interfered with the state's
exercise of essential and peculiar state powers.
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and peculiarly state powers."21sIn the states' dispute with the
EPA, the states claimed and the Administrator conceded that the
Administrator's interpretation of the Act would force their state
representatives to legislate. Certainly the right of a state to enact
laws is also essentially and peculiarly a state power.220

6. Summary
In summary, all of the circuits recognized that due to the
decisions in United States v. California and Maryland v. Wirtz,
the Administrator can control state activities that are direct
sources of pollution.221The D.C. Circuit, although not going as far
as did the Third Circuit in Pennsylvania v. EPA, did, like the
Third Circuit, extend the rationale of the Supreme Court cases
to allow the EPA to regulate state activities that are an indirect
source of pollution. The Third Circuit interpreted Wirtz as allowing the federal government to regulate state activities in the same
manner as private activities, the determining factor being
whether the activity in question has an effect on interstate comand Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, made
m e r ~ eThe
. ~ ~Fourth
~
no distinction between direct and indirect sources of pollution,
but apparently saw the Supreme Court cases as applicable only
to state activities that directly pollute the air.223
Both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits objected primarily to the
EPA's inspection and maintenance programs and its retrofit prog r a m ~These
. ~ ~ ~regulations required the states to enact and administer programs in order to force their citizens to comply with
the federal pollution control plan. Both courts viewed the EPA's
219. 221 U S . at 565.
220. See note 165 supra.
221. This result accords with the courts' view of statutory construction, since # 113
applies to all "persons" who violate the Act, and 5 302(e) of the Act includes state and
local governments as "persons." 42 U.S.C. § 1857h(e) (1970). See notes 64-69 and accompanying text supra.
The Ninth Circuit stated: "Tersely put, the Act, as we see it, permits sanctions
against a state that pollutes the air, but not against a state that chooses not to govern
polluters as the Administrator directs." 521 F.2d a t 832.
222. 500 F.2d a t 261.
223. The D.C. Circuit allows the Administrator's regulations that require the states
to construct exclusive bus lanes and purchase new buses by identifying the state's streets,
highways, and bus systems as indirect sources of pollution. 521 F.2d a t 989-90. On the
other hand, the Ninth and Fourth Circuits set aside similar provisions of California's and
Maryland's federally imposed plans, as discussed notes 189-192, 197-198and accompanying text supra.
224. The Fourth Circuit viewed these provisions as "astonishing regulations." 8
ENVIR.
REP.DEC.a t 1111.
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requirements in these areas as unconstitutional interference with
The D.C. Cirsovereign state legislative or regulatory functions.225
cuit also emphasized the substantial invasion of state sovereignty
created by these regulations, but allowed the EPA's regulation
prohibiting the state from licensing nonconforming vehicles. The
court viewed this exception as compelled by the result in United
States u. California, but was careful to point out the existence of
factors qualifying this exception. Simply put, it appears that the
court recognized two factors that must exist in order for the federal government to constitutionally require a state to administer
a federal regulatory scheme. The state role must (1) be limited
to traditional state activitiesZ2%md(2) not involve the state in
extensive use of its lawmaking or regulatory powers, including use
of its personnel and resources.227Thus, the decision in District of
225. The Attorney General of the United States, Edward H. Levi, found similar
constitutional faults with various provisions of the proposed National No-fault Act.
Hearings on S. 354 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 496
(1975). The Attorney General pointed out that the No-fault Act would, as emphasized by
Mr. Robert G. Dixon, require the states to "devote their funds and personnel, and to create
agencies and facilities to administer a Federal law, regardless of local feeling." Id. at 497.
Levi distinguishes the United States v. California - Maryland v. Wirtz line of cases
as "cases where the State mechanism was regarded as similar to that of any private
employer or entrepreneur." Id. a t 498.
The Attorney General recognized that the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 contain
many of the infirmities of the National No-fault Bill. In reference to Pennsylvania o. EPA,
he states: "I do not know whether the existence of this third circuit case should give
particular comfort to anyone concerned about principles of federalism." Id. a t 499. Nevertheless, reasons Levi, "the reference to the 10th amendment in Fry, the strong dissent in
Fry and the Supreme Court's action in setting down for reargument the National League
of Cities case and staying the operation of the recent amendments to the statute which
raise the question in that case all indicate that the issue involved here is a serious one,
located a t the margin of constitutionality." Id. at 500.
At the end of 1974, in an unpublished opinion, a three-judge district court denied a
preliminary injunction and dismissed the plaintiffs complaint in National League of
Cities v. Brennan, Civil No. 74-1812 (D.D.C., Dec. 31, 1974). The plaintiffs sought to
enjoin enforcement of parts of the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act and
related regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor which would have applied the
Act to all nonsupervisory state and municipal employees, including police and firemen.
On appeal to Chief Justice Burger as Circuit Justice of the D.C. Circuit, the Chief
Justice explained that the three-judge court viewed the case as raising "a difficult and
substantial question of law" although they felt that the Supreme Court's decision in
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) controlled the matter. Sharing the lower court's
"doubts and concerns," Chief Justice Burger ordered arguments before the entire Court.
National League of Cities v. Brennan, 419 U.S. 1321, 1323 (1974).
226. See note 181 supra.
227. 521 F.2d at 992. The court says the following concerning the Administrator's
inspection and maintenance regulations and retrofit regulations (excluding the licensing
provisions) :
In essence, the Administrator is here attempting to commandeer the regulatory powers of the states, along with their personnel and resources, for use in
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Colurn bia v. Train strikes a balance between the competing considerations-the extensive federal commerce power and the
states' right to an independent existence. In striking that balance, the court articulated a limitation to congressional exercise
of the commerce power while accommodating the letter of past
Supreme Court decisions.

D. Future Clarification by the Supreme Court
Both the Ninth and the D.C. Circuits' recognition of the
states' Tenth Amendment arguments was aided by the Supreme
Court's treatment of the issue in Fry v. United S t a t e ~ , ~ ~ W e c i d e d
after Pennsylvania u. EPA. Although applying the Economic Stabilization Act to state employees, the Court in Fry explicitly refers to the Tenth Amendment as declaring the "constitutional
policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that
impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively
in a federal system."229In addition, the Court was careful to note
t h a t the federal intrusion in both Wirtz and Fry was "quite
limited in application" and that the latter case dealt only with
an emergency measure necessitated by severe economic condit i o n ~ In
. ~dissent,
~~
Justice Rehnquist noted with approval the
majority's recognition of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on
federal power. Realizing that linedrawing is difficult, he nevertheless argued that Wirtz should be overruled as crossing the line
between permissible and impermissible federal intrusion in state
functions.231The Court's opinion in Fry suggests that the Supreme Court is in a position to side with the D.C., Ninth, and
Fourth Circuits. Should the Court agree to grant the EPA's petiit will have an
tion for review of the decisions of those
opportunity to make it clear that, regardless of how difficult the
conceptualization, a limit to federal intrusion into state affairs
does exist, is of constitutional origin, and will be enforced by the
courts.
If the Supreme Court accepts the states' coristitutional arguments, it must deal with language in past cases that appears to
administering and enforcing a federal regulatory program against the owners of
motor vehicles.

Id.

1

228. 421 U.S.542 (1975).
229. Id. at 547 n.7. See text accompanying notes 149-150supra.
230. Id. at 548.
231. Id. at 559.
232. See note 20 supra.
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recognize no limits on congressional exercise of the commerce
power. The position on the constitutional issues taken by the
Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits indicates an unwillingness to
extend the conclusions of those Supreme Court cases beyond their
factual contexts.233Language by the D.C. Circuit in District of
Columbia v. Train perhaps expresses the attitude of all three
circuits toward the liberal extension of the federal commerce
power by the United States Supreme Court:
Actually, in extending the commerce power to the tremendous limits it has been pressed in recent years, the Congress and
the Courts are most probably exceeding the intent of those who
wrote the C o n ~ t i t u t i o n . ~ ~ ~

The court substantiated this view by quoting from a letter written
by James Madison that indicates his feeling that the commerce
power was "intended as a negative and preventive provision
against injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a
power to be used for the positive purposes of the General Government . . . ."235 TO the court, there was "no question" that the
commerce power was being used by Congress and the EPA as an
affirmative tool of federal regulation.236The court, therefore, concluded that "[wle recognize the extent to which the Supreme
Court has expanded the federal commerce power, but we are not
willing to expand it beyond the limits that Congress specified or
court decisions presently require."237
Perhaps the Supreme Court's recognition in Fry that the
Tenth Amendment has substantive meaning will provide the
impetus for a renewed effort by the Court to articulate the scope
of an implicit constitutional limit to the federal commerce power.
In this important but difficult task, the efforts of the Fourth,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits provide a useful framework for future
judicial analysis.
233. The Ninth Circuit's governance test was developed to distinguish United States
v. California, Maryland v. Wirtz, and Fry v. United States. The court said in reference to
the latter two cases:
Neither of these cases holds or even suggests that a state's exercise of its police
power with respect to an economic activity which affects interstate commerce
is itself an economic activity or 'species of commercial intercourse' subject to
regulation by Congress.
521 F.2d at 838.
The Fourth Circuit's "unique state activity" test also served to distinguish California
and Wirtz. See Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIR.
REP.DEC.at 1112.
234. 521 F.2d a t 992.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.

